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An exceptional government coalition? 
he general elections of March 2018 opened, once again, a turbulent phase in Italian 
politics. While no coalition or party obtained an absolute majority of parliamen-
tary seats, both the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 stelle, M5S) and the League 
(Lega) claimed a win in the wake of the elections. The M5S turned out to be the most voted 
party in Italy, with as much as one-third of the popular vote. Surpassing its traditional co-
alition partner Forward Italy (Forza Italia, FI), the League became the leader of the most 
voted electoral cartel, as the centre-right bloc received as a whole about 37% of the vote. 
After a long government-formation process characterised by many twists and turns, a 
new cabinet was sworn in June 2018, including the M5S and the League as coalition part-
ners and featuring law professor Giuseppe Conte as Prime Minister (PM). To mark a 
difference with the party system and policy processes which had characterised Italian po-
litical life since the mid-1990s, the leaders of the two ruling parties – M5S’s Luigi di Maio 
and the League’s Matteo Salvini – defined the new cabinet as the ‘government of change’. 
The latter was indeed formed by parties that were (the M5S) or had recently been (the 
League) outside the mainstream of the Italian party system. For the first time, the two 
political forces which had shaped electoral competition and had alternated in govern-
ment almost uninterruptedly since 1994 – centre-right Forward Italy and centre-left 
Democratic Party (Partito democratico, PD) and its forerunners – were together put out 
of power. 
The novelty of the Conte government, also known as the ‘yellow-green’ govern-
ment, captured the attention of political observers around the world. In this regard, the 
headlines of some prominent newspapers published the day after Conte took the oath of 
office – ‘People power’ (The Times, June 2 2018), ‘Italy’s populists take power’ (Wash-
ington Post, June 2 2018) – are telling. Following the elections, Di Maio himself had 
stated: ‘Today the third republic commences, which will be at last the republic of Italian 
citizens’ (March 5 2018). 
In a comparative perspective, the outcome of the Italian elections of March 2018 
and the formation of a ‘populist’ executive potentially fit well into more general patterns 
of restructuring of well-established party systems across Europe, especially as a 
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consequence of the ‘Great Recession’ (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017; Hernández 
and Kriesi 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2018). Moreover, these developments seem con-
sistent with the increasing politicisation of issues other than the economic left-right in 
the most recent period in Italy and in the rest of Europe (Giannetti, Pedrazzani, and 
Pinto 2017; Kriesi et al. 2012). 
Nonetheless, leaving aside the rhetoric of party leaders and possible media sensa-
tionalism, the formation of the so-called ‘government of change’ has undoubtedly 
introduced several novel elements into the Italian political system. The first and most 
apparent ‘change’ with the past is the (almost) unprecedented nature of the coalition 
members. The Conte government is supported by a ‘populist’ majority in the parlia-
ment, as the two coalition parties took strong anti-Europe and anti-establishment 
stances before and after the elections. The distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ 
(Mudde 2004) is coupled with a call for instruments of direct democracy in the case of 
the M5S (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Corbetta 2017), and with nativist, anti-immi-
gration attitudes in the case of the League (Passarelli and Tuorto 2018). In an attempt 
not to become part of the casta, the former seems to have retained some of its original 
characteristics and aspirations of radical renovation of the political process (Tronconi 
2018). The latter, which was previously known as the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN), 
is indeed the oldest party in the Italian party system. However, it chose to remain outside 
the government starting from the end of 2011, when technocrat Mario Monti was ap-
pointed PM during the most acute phase of the economic crisis. Under the leadership of 
Salvini, the League gradually turned from a federalist party to a typical nationalist, radi-
cal right force. In the 2018 elections, both the M5S and the League succeeded in 
channelling citizens’ frustrations with Italian traditional parties and with the European 
Union (EU) (Itanes 2018; Valbruzzi and Vignati 2018). 
A second point of discontinuity regards the peculiar ministerial composition of the 
Conte cabinet, where a number of technocrats stand beside ministers coming from the 
two ‘populist’ coalition parties. To begin with, the two ruling parties chose as PM a virtu-
ally unknown figure without any previous political or parliamentary experience. The 
appointment of a non-partisan PM is not new in Italy. However, unlike Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi, Lamberto Dini and Monti – who headed a semi-technocratic cabinet in 1993 and 
fully technocratic cabinets in 1995 and 2011, respectively –Conte is neither a high-rank-
ing bureaucrat nor a renowned economist. His primary task seems to be that of ensuring 
coordination between the two coalition partners in the course of day-to-day policymak-
ing. As a whole, the yellow-green cabinet has a strong technocratic connotation, as it 
presents the highest share of ‘technical’ ministerial personnel among all the Italian par-
tisan governments (Valbruzzi 2018). Besides the PM office, five of the nineteen 
ministerial positions were given to non-partisan figures. In particular, to ensure the 
credibility of Italy abroad, two independents were appointed in the key portfolios of For-
eign Affairs and Economy. The latter element is actually in line with the past, as the 
economic portfolios of Italian governments have been heavily controlled by non-parti-
san ministers since the 1990s (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018). However, the ministerial 
personnel of the M5S-League cabinet exhibits the highest degree of volatility – i.e., a 
share of ministers belonging to parties that were not in power in the previous cabinet – 
in Italy’s post-war history (Calossi and Cicchi 2018).  
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Compared with the usual patterns of government formation in Italy, the presence 
of a formal coalition contract represents a third innovation. The government formation 
process bringing to the Conte cabinet was similar to the process leading to the Letta cab-
inet in many respects. Just as in the spring of 2013, the yellow-green government 
coalition was not based on an alliance formed before the election, but was built after a 
long bargaining period in which one of the pre-electoral coalitions was broken and the 
President of the Republic played a crucial role (Curini and Pinto 2017). Yet, for the first 
time in Italian republican history, the yellow-green cabinet relies upon a formal post-
electoral contract signed by the leaders of the coalition parties. While absent until 1994, 
some forms of coalition agreements made their appearance in Italy during the Second 
Republic. However, these were much less formalised than the coalition treaties that can 
be found in other European countries. In fact, they were simply the joint electoral mani-
festo that the winning coalition had issued before the election (Cotta and Marangoni 
2015; Moury 2013). The coalition contract between the M5S and the League is more sim-
ilar to the pacts that are common in countries like Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Not only is it a public document officially signed by the two party leaders 
after the election, but it also sets up mechanisms for handling possible conflicts within 
the coalition along with a list of policy priorities.  
Shifting the focus from the executive to legislative institutions, a fourth change with 
the recent past is a regained congruence in the partisan composition of the two houses of 
the Italian Parliament. While being almost perfectly congruent throughout the First Re-
public, starting from 1994 the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate had increasingly 
diverged in terms of the distribution of seats among parties owing to the electoral reforms 
of 1993 and, above all, of 2005 (Zucchini 2013). As a result, less than half of the cabinets 
from 1994 onward controlled a majority of seats in both houses(Pedrazzani 2017). The 
new electoral system used in March 2018 – the Rosato law – produced very limited distor-
tion in the translation of votes into seats (Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte 2018), creating 
two congruent houses in terms of partisan composition. Consequently, the Conte govern-
ment is a minimal winning coalition in both the Chamber and the Senate. 
Finally, a fifth novelty in the political landscape under the yellow-green cabinet 
deals with the big policy reforms that the M5S’s and League’s leaders pledged to en-
hance. During the electoral campaign, the M5S promised a universal scheme of basic 
income while the League outlined a block of immigration and tax cuts in the form of a 
flat tax on income. Both parties were committed to repealing several policy measures 
adopted by previous governments: among these, an unpopular pension restructuring 
that was enacted under the Monti executive and a controversial law increasing compul-
sory vaccinations that was approved under the outgoing Gentiloni cabinet. Although the 
leaders of M5S and the League did not openly declare to be willing to abandon the Euro 
currency, they also vowed to use tough tactics to force the other EU members to accept 
Italy’s new spending plans. The reforms promised by the yellow-green coalition would 
then radically change the status quo in several crucial policy domains. 
Why this Special Issue 
For all the above-mentioned reasons, the birth of the ‘government of change’ can be a true 
turning point in the most recent evolution of the Italian political system. Moreover, the 
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‘populist’ government coalition formed in Italy can be an extremely interesting object of 
study also in comparative perspective. The aim of this Special Issue is to shed some initial 
light on the new political phase under the M5S-League government. We make no claim to 
provide a comprehensive account of the formation, dynamics and policy production of 
the new cabinet, as just a few months have passed since its swearing in on 1 June 2018. 
Nonetheless, this Special Issue can offer to the scholarly community in Italy and abroad 
some analytic tools and initial empirical findings to develop further research. 
The Special Issue consists of seven research articles analysing a number of topics re-
lated to the functioning of the Italian political system under the ‘government of change’: 
the traits of the new parliamentary class elected in March 2018, the restructuring in the 
party system and in the space of party competition, the organisational evolution of the 
M5S in its route to power, the differences and commonalities of the two ruling parties 
along new salient dimensions of competition and in terms of their behaviour in parlia-
ment, the characteristics of the coalition contract upon which the yellow-green 
government is based, and some initial assessment of the way the M5S and the League are 
about to implement the new policy priorities in the government’s agenda. In spite of the 
different theoretical and methodological approaches, all the articles offer fresh, descrip-
tive (but theory grounded) accounts that help us to understand Italian politics under the 
‘government of change’. On the whole, this Special Issue can give some useful hints about 
the degree of cohesiveness of the yellow-green government and the issues that might put 
the coalition under strain. 
Content and findings of the Special Issue 
The analysis of the Italian political system under the ‘government of change’ provided by 
this Special Issue starts with an evaluation of some key characteristics of the parliament 
which gave birth to that government – in particular, the traits of the new parliamentary 
class elected in March 2018. In their article, Bruno Marino, Nicola Martocchia Diodati 
and Luca Verzichelli analyse data on members of the Chamber of Deputies taken from 
the database of the Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP), showing that the 
general elections of 2018 did not engender any radical renewal of Italian parliamentary 
class. The authors put forward a typology of members of parliament (MPs) based on their 
previous experience at the local government level, career within the party and parliamen-
tary seniority, which is used as an analytical tool to explore patterns of elite recruitment 
and circulation. Although a noticeable number of fresh new parliamentarians were 
elected in March 2018 (especially within the M5S ranks), well-established politicians at 
the national level currently represent more than half of Italian deputies. Newcomers are 
almost absent in the League’s group, where experience in sub-national governments or in 
the local party appears to be extremely relevant in order to be recruited and become an 
MP. For most Italian parties, MPs who are more experienced and central in the party or-
ganisation also benefited from the use of multi-candidacies in the last election. With 
regard to the selection of parliamentary and ministerial offices, the analysis reveals that, 
in spite of parties’ rhetoric associated with the ‘government of change’, the patterns 
adopted by the two coalition partners are rather traditional. The most prestigious offices 
tend to be given to those MPs who had already been elected in 2013 in the case of the M5S, 
and to top-experienced politicians in the case of the League.  
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A crucial task in a study of Italian politics under the ‘government of change’ is to un-
derstand the very birth of the yellow-green cabinet in light of well-grounded theoretical 
perspectives developed in the scholarly literature on government formation. To this pur-
pose, the article by Daniela Giannetti, Andrea Pedrazzani and Luca Pinto offers an 
account of the formation of the Conte cabinet based on a spatial approach to party compe-
tition and on the policy-seeking motivations of the parties involved in the coalition 
bargaining process. The authors assess the dimensionality of Italian policy space and 
build bi-dimensional maps of party competition on the basis of the salience parties attrib-
ute to various issues and the parties’ positions on those issues. The analysis relies on 
original expert survey data on Italian parties collected by the authors following the elec-
tion of March 2018. The 2018 data are compared with similar data covering Italian 
national elections since 2001. As the authors point out, the formation of the M5S-League 
cabinet can hardly be explained if we assume that the classical economic left-right repre-
sented the main axis of party competition in the general election of 2018. Indeed, the 
policy platforms of the two ruling parties are far from each other in economic terms. How-
ever, a diachronic analysis highlights dramatic changes in Italy’s policy space, with a 
decline of economic issues and a significant rise in the salience of non-economic issues 
such as European integration and immigration. The formation of the Conte government 
was then decisively influenced by long-term processes in Italian politics, and can be ex-
plained in light of the policy positions held by the M5S and the League on non-economic 
domains. 
The differences and commonalities between the M5S and the League are investi-
gated more in depth by two articles in this Special Issue. One of these is the contribution 
by Benedetta Carlotti and Stella Gianfreda, who analyse how two highly politicised topics 
connected to the general integration-demarcation cleavage – the EU and immigration – 
are framed by the two coalition partners in the legislative arena. The authors outline a 
multi-dimensional (re-)conceptualisation of the EU and immigration issues aimed at un-
tangling the various specific aspects of these two multi-faceted dimensions. To assess 
possible differences between the two coalition parties in the political arguments used to 
frame European integration and immigration, an original dataset was constructed com-
prising the legislative speeches delivered by M5S and League representatives in the 
Italian and European parliament. The data, which cover debates held between May 2014 
and December 2016, were coded through computer-assisted discourse analysis. Results 
highlight that M5S legislators tend to emphasise an anti-elite position when talking about 
immigration and the EU, while the League’s speeches reflect more of a cultural-identitar-
ian and sovereigntist framing strategy. In particular, the League opposes immigration, 
relying most of all on arguments related to nativism and law and order logics. Moreover, 
Salvini’s party criticises the EU from a typically sovereigntist point of view, whereby su-
pra-national institutions are blamed for seizing fundamental decision-making powers 
from the member states. Conversely, the M5S frames its opposition to European integra-
tion by stressing the lack of democratic accountability of the EU-level elites, while M5S’s 
speeches about immigration tend to focus on the mismanagement of the refugee crisis. 
The analysis also shows the Movement’s adaptation to different institutional settings, as 
its members frame immigration-related topics using distinct arguments in the Italian 
parliament and in the European parliament. Such differences in how the two parties 
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position themselves on the integration-demarcation dimension can point to possible 
‘wedges’ in the current governing coalition in Italy. 
The common traits and differences between the two ruling parties are the primary 
object of study of another contribution in this Special Issue. In particular, the article by 
Elisabetta De Giorgi and António Dias compares the legislative activities of the M5S and 
the League when these parties entered Parliament as new challengers. As underlined by 
the authors, the M5S entered the Italian Parliament after the start of the Great Recession. 
Similarly, the (Northern) League had crossed the representation threshold more than 
twenty years previously, amid Italy’s political and economic crisis of the late 1980s-early 
1990s. The authors apply social network analysis to bill proposals in order to empirically 
evaluate the extent to which each of the two parties cooperated with other opposition 
groups during its first term in the Italian Parliament – that is, the 1992-1994 legislature 
for the League and the 2013-2018 legislature for the M5S. The analysed patterns of bill co-
sponsorship in the Chamber of Deputies highlight strong similarities in the legislative be-
haviour of the M5S and the League when they first entered Parliament as new 
challengers, as both parties chose to stand apart from the other parliamentary groups, 
whether in government or in opposition. Such a strategy served the same purpose: both 
the M5S and the League sought to present themselves to voters as an alternative to all the 
existing political parties. Interestingly, under Salvini the League revived this strategy in 
the 2013-2018 legislature, in an attempt to (re-)build for itself a reputation as an anti-es-
tablishment political force. Altogether, these findings suggest that the new ‘relational’ 
dimension investigated by the authors – i.e., the patterns of cooperation with other par-
ties in the legislative arena – can be fruitfully employed as a further dimension of analysis 
in future research on new challenger parties. 
Whereas the League has long experience in political institutions and has conse-
quently been extensively studied by scholars in Italy and abroad, the M5S is a much newer 
political actor and hence is a much less known subject in the political science literature. 
To help fill this gap, the article by Davide Vittori provides a theory-grounded account of 
the organisational evolution of the Movement from its early days before the economic cri-
sis to its participation in the Conte executive. In analysing the transformation of the M5S 
from a challenger party into a government member, the author makes a compelling com-
parison with the Greek Syriza, whose route to power has been very similar to that of the 
M5S in spite of a different ideological profile. As demonstrated in the article, for these two 
(formerly) anti-establishment parties, elections represented a crucial factor for bringing 
change within the party organisation. Although a link between electoral shocks and inter-
nal reforms is normally found also in the case of mainstream parties, for Syriza and the 
M5S party change was triggered by an unexpected good performance (in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively) rather than by an electoral defeat. Following electoral breakthrough, both 
policy-seeking Syriza and democracy-seeking M5S became more oriented towards a 
purely vote-seeking strategy. In both cases, internal reforms were introduced in an at-
tempt to anticipate future challenges coming from a new electoral shock – i.e., an even 
better electoral result and possible participation in the government. The author also un-
derlines that organisational changes in Syriza and the M5S followed the same pattern 
characterising mainstream parties, as centralisation was strengthened and the institu-
tionalisation process was steered by the most powerful party face at the time of the 
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internal reform. In the case of the M5S, internal reforms reinforced a structure based on 
dual leadership: an organisational leadership (the internet and publishing company 
Casaleggio Associati) that controls the party in central office, and a political leadership 
(Di Maio, who has replaced Belle Grillo) that controls the party in public office. In many 
respects, then, anti-establishment parties do not really differ from mainstream parties 
when it comes to taking or managing power. 
As discussed above, the presence of a formal post-electoral contract between the M5S 
and the League undoubtedly represents a major innovation in the patterns of government 
formation in Italy. The article by José Santana-Pereira and Catherine Moury is devoted 
precisely to such an agreement, which was dubbed ‘Contract for the government of 
change’ (Contratto per il governo del cambiamento) by its drafters. As the authors stress, 
the coalition agreement at the basis of the yellow-green coalition is exceptional in several 
ways in the Italian context: it is the first post-electoral coalition treaty in Italy’s republi-
can history, and came out of negotiations between parties that had very different policy 
priorities and no record of cooperation in the past. In this article, the 2018 coalition con-
tract is compared with former coalition documents adopted in Italy since the mid-1990s 
as well as with the party manifestos issued by the M5S and the League before the 2018 
general elections. During the Italian Second Republic, the joint electoral programme of 
the winning pre-electoral coalition – often a long, comprehensive but vague document – 
served also as a bargaining platform for the government. Although no less vague, the M5S-
League agreement contrasts with those documents because it was formalised after the 
election and was specifically conceived of as a programmatic basis for the government. 
Both the M5S and the League had to compromise in the 2018 contract, in which they also 
toned down their Euroscepticism. Altogether, the authors suggest that the lack of preci-
sion in the coalition contract may grant a great deal of autonomy to cabinet ministers in 
the course of the legislative term. 
Certainly, the label ‘government of change’ itself hints at big policy reforms that, ac-
cording to the public pledges of the M5S’s and League’s leaders, the Conte cabinet is 
willing to bring about. Since just six months have passed since the birth of the govern-
ment, it is of course too early to evaluate the implementation of its new policy agenda. 
However, some initial clue about how the two coalition partners are about to enact the 
promised changes can already be found. In this regard, the final article in this Special Is-
sue deals with one of the policy fields in which the yellow-green government is supposed 
to alter the status quo – that is, childhood vaccination. In particular, Mattia Casula and 
Federico Toth analyse how the two ruling parties are coping with a possible reform of the 
controversial ‘Lorenzin decree’, which was approved in 2017 and increased the number 
of compulsory vaccinations. As illustrated by the authors, both the M5S and the League 
are in favour of modifying the Lorenzin decree, but they do not agree on the strategy to be 
followed. The article provides a rich account of the debate surrounding mandatory vac-
cination in Italy, a topic that has divided both the public opinion and the political parties. 
In this debate, the M5S was apparently on the same side of the League, although the for-
mer seemed to wink at the so-called ‘no vax’ movement, and the latter held a much more 
pragmatic position. In addition, the authors formulate some plausible hypotheses about 
how the yellow-green government will tackle the issue of infant vaccinations, suggesting 
that the choice will probably depend on the balance of power within the coalition. 
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Although focusing on a single policy topic, this article may be useful for understanding 
how the M5S-League coalition will deal with other controversial issues such as the con-
struction of high-speed rail networks (TAV) and the building of a natural gas pipeline 
(TAP) on Italian territory. 
Open issues and avenues for future research 
Summing up, the articles of this Special Issue have sketched a tentative account of the 
Italian political system under the ‘government of change’. Although a number of crucial 
topics have been touched upon, the picture is of course far from being complete. This is 
because just a few months have passed since the swearing in of the Conte executive. 
Moreover, a final word on the functioning of the political system under the M5S-League 
government cannot be provided as Italy’s political situation is still evolving in many re-
spects. In particular, several important issues remain uncertain and may open up 
avenues for future enquiry. 
First, the Italian party system may undergo further transformations. At the time of 
writing, it seems indeed hard to tell whether the tripolar party system that has emerged 
since 2013 will stabilise or a new bipolar phase will begin. In this regard, much will de-
pend on the electoral rules as well as on the relevance of the ‘integration-demarcation’ 
cleavage, whose salience appears to have increased in Italy in the most recent period. 
Second, the fundamental actors in the party system are themselves subject to a process 
of internal change: the M5S is experiencing the evolution from an anti-establishment 
political force to a government party, the League seems oriented to fully becoming a 
right-wing party seeking votes on the entire national territory, the PD is in search of a 
new leader and FI is coping with the decline of its historical leader. Third, the possible 
duration of the M5S-League cabinet is uncertain. On the one hand, tensions in the day-
to-day relationships between the two coalition parties are not unexpected. On the other 
hand, the outcome of the European Parliament election of May 2019 can open up new 
possibilities for either the M5S or the League, which can undermine the stability of the 
government. 
Fourth, and related to the former point, it is unclear which model of decision-mak-
ing will prevail in the coalition. While a prime ministerial model does not seem to apply 
to the Conte cabinet, it is probably too early to know whether individual ministers are left 
free to set policy in their department or ministerial discretion is somehow mitigated 
through specific mechanisms. So far, a lot of ‘position-taking’ activity can be observed, 
as Salvini and Di Maio tend to publicly take positions that please their own party constit-
uency, sometimes in spite of the agreed-on coalition compromise. At the same time, the 
‘conciliation committee’, an instrument specifically established for settling intra-cabi-
net divergences, does not seem to have been used yet to enforce the M5S-League 
contract. The most severe conflicts within the coalition are handled through semi-infor-
mal meetings involving Di Maio, Salvini and the PM, and possibly other key ministers. 
Fifth, at the time of writing it is not possible to know if the ‘government of change’ will 
indeed be able to enact the promised radical policy reforms. The process of approval of 
the government’s budgetary bill that is currently taking place in the Italian parliament 
is highlighting not only the importance of external ‘hurdles’ such as economic and fi-
nancial constraints, but also the policy divergences between the two coalition partners. 
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Furthermore, the implementation of the coalition treaty can be hindered by the appear-
ance of unexpected new issues on the policy agenda. Finally, it is not clear whether the 
government will try to make only reforms at the policy level or it will also – and more 
ambitiously – attempt to change the ‘rules of the game’, modifying the electoral system 
and the constitution. 
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